Analysis and Proposals
Conflict between radicalism and conservatism began in the
17th
century in the transition from monarchy to democracy in
which force was made necessary because of royalist
intransigence. Left extremism developed from the role that
error played in the evolution of radical policy to overcome
these obstacles. John Milton expressed this paradox in his
proposal that the 17th
century English republic should be a dictatorship to
suppress royalist resistance. The American Revolution
succeeded without such extreme measures due to the
favourable circumstances in which it took place. French
radicalism used them and was nevertheless defeated. This
helps explain why leading historians maintain the origins
of totalitarianism may be traced to the French revolution.
Americans took the separation of faith and reason pioneered
by the British scientific revolution and with this the
principle of religious toleration as fundamental tenets of
government by consent to craft a constitutional settlement
upon practical foundations. French radicals however adopted
more desperate measures which bore less relation to
scientific method, oriented instead to the ideas of
Machiavelli, and with this state control of faith to
enforce revolutionary ideology. Thomas Jefferson believed
the 'whole art of politics lies in being honest with the
people.' Machiavelli thought ends justify means and that
lying to the people is an essential requirement of
government.
Although the American right ensured the US constitution was
modelled more closely on the aristocratic organisational
principles of the Roman republic than those of Athenian
democracy, American radicalism nevertheless succeeded in
establishing a Bill of Rights which preserved bottom up
mechanisms of popular power to help guarantee freedom of
speech: the rights to jury trial and armed self defence. As
Jefferson stated, the right to trial by jury is the only
means by which a government can be held accountable to its
constitution: trials without juries may be conducted for
the government, but not necessarily for the people. Jury
trial is an effective check upon laws which are
unacceptable to the people, since juries can simply refuse
to enforce them. The right to bear arms is also a necessary
barrier to creeping forms of tyranny. Among the greatest
threats to free speech is collusion between governments and
terrorism. Such practices are common - even the UK
government stands accused of them in Ireland. The right to
self defence consequently remains a necessary protection by
which free speech can be securely exercised. Unlike the
American Bill of Rights the French Declaration of Rights
did not incorporate either of these mechanisms of popular
control. French radical leaders had an autocratic approach
to common sense as compared to Americans due ultimately to
the fact that Europe was a century behind Britain in
politics and science and even further behind in the
development of rights for the common people. American
rights to jury trial and self defence have their origin in
the British Anglo Saxon period and in large part retain
continuity with democracy in its original, Athenian
expression in the 5th
century BC, in which government by jury, and through this,
sortition (election by random selection) play a central
role. European law by contrast is based on Roman law, which
broke this democratic continuity when the ancient city
republics were replaced by 1500 years of dictatorship. It
incorporates a top down mode of reasoning derived from the
imperial principle that sovereigns are not bound by the
law. In that sense the French Declaration is very different
to the American Bill. While the latter is oriented to
defending free speech, the former makes such rights
ultimately subordinate to the 'general will' of leaders.
The errors of French radicalism and its defeat by
monarchism retarded progress in both Europe and America.
European radicalism failed to overcome the legacy of
autocratic thinking concerning democracy and common sense.
Totalitarian ideologies developed in large part from this
circumstance. The call for dictatorship as a necessary form
of republican government became a radical dogma, such as in
Marxism. US democracy continued to develop but within
narrow parameters such that radical aspirations to develop
Athenian democratic forms were shelved to maintain unity
with anti-British conservatives in the more internationally
isolated conditions. Consequently US democracy, though
still the most developed in the world, remains narrower and
less flexible than envisaged by Jefferson and Tom Paine.
Their hopes for democratic progress can be understood as
forestalled in three main areas: First, US elections remain
excessively elitist in nature, based exclusively on voting
for nominated, competing candidates who in some, frequently
artificial sense, are attributed with exceptional qualities
- what the ancient Greeks termed elective aristocracy.
Elections in Athens by contrast were mainly by sortition
and were so held in order both to give ordinary citizens an
equal chance to hold positions of power and also -
crucially - to contain the influence of secretive,
aristocratic factions. Whereas elective aristocracy - as
used in Rome - has the self evident tendency to engender
factions, sortition - as used in Athens - has the equally
intrinsic tendency to contain their influence. American
conservatives ensured the US constitution followed the
Roman example, not that of Athens. Consequently radicalism
largely failed to contain the power of secret, masonic
factions. The American Antimasonic Party, which at its peak
held 37 seats in congress, similarly failed in these tasks.
Second, payment for political participation has not been
fully developed. The US Senate was modelled on that of
Rome, and for decades was similarly presupposed by the
understanding that politicians should not be paid because
they should be motivated by virtue alone, and that
accordingly since only the leisured aristocracy could
afford to be virtuous only the rich were fit to govern. In
stark contrast in Athenian democracy politicians were
usually elected by random selection and paid for their
services. In fact Aristotle defines democracy as 'rule by
the poor.' Any Athenian citizen could earn half a day's
wage for attending the City Assembly every ten days. Even
today nothing comparable exists in modern US political
process, which like Rome, remains highly influenced by
hidden interests.
Third, the means of constitutional review and taxation in
US politics do not reflect the egalitarian and
participatory aspirations of American revolutionary
radicalism. These were derived from Athenian democracy and
the common sense realist tenets of British scientific
method. Jefferson saw them as resting upon the self evident
truths of common sense, and thereafter upon further truths
derived from them through practical experiment. These
insights inform the Declaration of Independence: 'We hold
these truths to be self evident: that all men are created
equal with certain inalienable rights, among which are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' Jefferson and
Paine agreed upon a further self evident truth: that 'the
earth belongs to the living.' This was not included in the
constitution because Madison persuaded Jefferson it would
endanger unity with anti-British conservatives. Its meaning
was that each generation should have the right to revise
the constitution and redistribute inherited wealth through
what Jefferson proposed to be a 19 year cycle of review.
These aspirations were never realised. As a result the US
constitution remained narrower, less egalitarian, and less
participatory than American radicalism had envisaged. It
evolved into a two party system in which economic
hereditary factors largely predominate. While Jefferson
viewed parties as being necessary to democracy, he also saw
them as potentially harmful vehicles for factional intrigue
- famously he stated that if he had to go to heaven with a
party he would rather not go. It is, however, the two party
system that now predominates, with few exceptions,
throughout the world. These systems were introduced by the
European aristocracies after it became clear that democracy
in its limited, early American form could be adapted to
preserve their interests. Totalitarian ideologies such as
communism and fascism developed in large part due to
failure to overcome the legacy of political backwardness
bestowed with defeat of the French revolution.
Anglo-American common sense realism took second place in
these ideologies to prescientific European philosophical
theories such as those of Machiavelli. In such fashion
Marxism claimed socialism must 'inevitably' replace
capitalism through dictatorship, largely because it does
not distinguish the self evident truths of common sense
from truths which can be derived from them through
practical experiment. Although Marxism has since shown
itself as impractical, how much of this appearance is due
to Leftist deception and stealth is an open question.
Beneath the surface spin of public relations many Leftists
still uphold the same dogmas: that socialism must for all
time replace capitalism; that to achieve this state power
must be monopolised by radicalism; that lying to the people
is necessary to do this. Left and Right militancy operate
in polarised conflict with each other striving to overcome
their opponent by force or by stealth. The mutual suspicion
endemic to this struggle has frequently erupted into
violence. World War II was launched because of fears that
the party system itself had been suborned by a hidden
monopoly of power controlled by a single, secretive
faction. These fears remain today in the Arab world, and
may yet result in a regional, possibly even World War.
Similar fears exist concerning cross party Europhile
eagerness to adopt the European constitution thinly
disguised as a 'treaty' to avoid a referendum, knowing the
people would reject it given the chance. Even David Cameron
is suspected of communist affiliations by Margaret
Thatcher's closest ally, Norman Tebbit.
The
present character of 'human rights' has been influenced by
these factors. Leftists now envisage human rights as those
which are bestowed by benevolent ruling authorities, much
as indicated in the French Declaration. The EU Convention
on Human Rights and the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights reflect this approach and are seen by many as
superceding the American Bill of Rights. In reality however
the American Bill is far more radical and egalitarian.
Whereas the European convention and the UN Declaration were
agreed as diplomatic settlements between government
bureaucrats the American Bill comprises fundamental
constitution forming concessions demanded by the radical
wing of the most revolutionary movement in history from the
very leaders who had, courageously, won independence for
them in seven years of war. It is a blueprint for the
exercise of bottom up forms of popular power to be used
independently of and if necessary actually against those
who rule. By contrast the rights upheld by the UN and the
EU are essentially pragmatic compromises on how people
ought to be treated by their rulers. The totalitarian Left
has exploited these ambiguities to substitute what are
diffuse, easily flouted guidelines on good government -
including those on the secret ballot - for those specific
and fundamental rights which empower citizens to disobey
and if necessary even use deadly force against their
rulers. Exploiting pacifist sentiment, Leftism instead
almost invariably presents these rights as bearing on
criminal matters alone, with little or no mention of their
crucial role in the defence of free speech in conditions of
creeping tyranny. Indeed, David Cameron and assorted
leftists now wish to imply that citizens meet
'responsibilities' to the state if they wish to be treated
fairly by it in a proposed British 'Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities.' Such Orwellian doublespeak similarly
pervades the Europhile project. In place of the ten pages
of the US constitution the EU treaty has 300 pages of
prescriptions as to how society and the economy should
operate, in which the distinctions between the self evident
and what can be derived from it by practical experiment is
lost. In fact it is in most respects a Leftist bundle of
policies which should be subject to review in accordance
with the results of practice, but which are granted a
constitutional status so that opposition forces will face
greater difficulties in changing them. Having excluded
rights to prevent creeping forms of tyranny the European
constitutional treaty amounts to a one way street to a
future monopolised by a bureaucratic
elite.